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Abstract
Deep reinforcement learning has become an important paradigm for constructing
agents that can enter complex multi-agent situations and improve their policies
through experience. One commonly used technique is reactive training - applying
standard RL methods while treating other agents as a part of the learner’s environ-
ment. It is known that in general-sum games reactive training can lead groups of
agents to converge to inefficient outcomes. We focus on one such class of envi-
ronments: Stag Hunt games. Here agents either choose a risky cooperative policy
(which leads to high payoffs if both choose it but low payoffs to an agent who
attempts it alone) or a safe one (which leads to a safe payoff no matter what). We
ask how we can change the learning rule of a single agent to improve its outcomes
in Stag Hunts that include other reactive learners. We extend existing work on
reward-shaping in multi-agent reinforcement learning and show that that making a
single agent prosocial, that is, making them care about the rewards of their partners
can increase the probability that groups converge to good outcomes. Thus, even if
we control a single agent in a group making that agent prosocial can increase our
agent’s long-run payoff. We show experimentally that this result carries over to
a variety of more complex environments with Stag Hunt-like dynamics including
ones where agents must learn from raw input pixels.
1 Introduction
Constructing agents which can make good decisions in complex environments is a cornerstone
of modern artificial intelligence research. An increasingly popular paradigm for this task is deep
reinforcement learning (deep RL, Kaelbling et al. (1996); Sutton and Barto (1998); Silver et al.
(2016); Mnih et al. (2015)). Recent work has become interested in using deep RL to construct agents
that can function well in environments which include other agents (Silver et al., 2016; Lazaridou
et al., 2017; Das et al., 2017; Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2017b; Evtimova et al., 2017; Foerster
et al., 2016; Havrylov and Titov, 2017; Lewis et al., 2017; Heinrich and Silver, 2016; Peng et al.,
2017; Leibo et al., 2017). In many of these examples deep RL been applied by the method of reactive
training where the learner treats other agents as part of the environment and optimizes its own reward.
Reactive training works very well in zero-sum situations, where for one agent to gain the other
must lose (Silver et al., 2016; Wu and Tian, 2016; Neumann, 1928). However, for general-sum
games good outcomes are far from guaranteed (Sandholm and Crites, 1996; Leibo et al., 2017; Lerer
and Peysakhovich, 2017; Foerster et al., 2017a). In this paper we will study a simple modification
to independent learning that can be applied to a single agent out of a dyad and can lead to better
outcomes in a class of coordination games.
As with the works above we are interested in situations where we construct an agent that will go
into an initially poorly understood environment (which we refer to as a game). Our agent must learn
from its experiences to update its policy and maximize some scalar reward. However, there will also
be other agents which we do not control and will also learn from their experiences using a form of
reactive learning. Our starting point will be standard independent multi-agent reinforcement learning
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(independent MARL). In independent MARL each agent treats the other agents simply as a fixed part
of the environment.1
If all agents use independent MARL, and if the system converges to deterministic strategies, then
it will have converged to a Nash equilibrium of the game (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) - a set of
strategies such that no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate.2 In general-sum games there can
be multiple equilibria and thus initial conditions can alter the long-run payoffs that our agent (and
others involved) can earn. In addition, in some classes of games many different kinds of dynamics
can converge on equilibria with low payoffs even though high payoff equilibria exist (Kandori et al.,
1993; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). We will focus on one such example: Stag Hunt games.
In the simple, matrix-form, two-player Stag Hunt each player makes a choice between a risky action
(hunt the stag) and a safe action (forage for mushrooms). Foraging for mushrooms always yields a
safe payoff while hunting yields a high payoff if the other player also hunts but a very low payoff if
one shows up to hunt alone. There are two Nash equilibria: either both players show up to hunt (this
is called the payoff dominant equilibrium) or both players stay home and forage (this is called the
risk-dominant equilibrium Harsanyi et al. (1988)).
In the Stag Hunt, when the payoff to hunting alone is sufficiently low, dyads of independent learners
as well as evolving populations converge to the risk-dominant (safe) equilibrium (Kandori et al.,
1993; Nowak, 2006; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Matignon et al., 2012). The intuition comes from
the fact that even a slight amount of doubt about whether one’s partner will show up causes an agent
to choose the safe action. This in turn causes partners to be less likely to hunt in the future and the
system trends to the inefficient equilibrium.
Failure to coordinate on good outcomes in the Stag Hunt (and related games) has been extensively
studied outside of MARL in many fields, particularly in the social and behavioral sciences (Kandori
et al., 1993; Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993; Van Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer, 2003; Yoshida et al.,
2008) because the Stag Hunt is a simple example of a more general type of coordination dynamic
which is ubiquitous in real world interactions. For this reason how agents can avoid the spiral to the
inefficient equilibrium is a problem of interest across many fields.
Existing work in RL has proposed modifications to independent MARL to increase the probability
of the system converging to a preferred equilibrium (Littman, 2001; Babes et al., 2008; Devlin and
Kudenko, 2011; Devlin et al., 2011; Kapetanakis and Kudenko, 2002; Yoshida et al., 2008; Panait
et al., 2008; Matignon et al., 2012; Wang and Sandholm, 2003). One prominent set of work has
investigated endowing agents with a form of optimism, eg. lenient learning (Panait et al., 2008;
Matignon et al., 2012) or Frequency Maximum Q-learning (Kapetanakis and Kudenko, 2002), while
another has focused on potential-based reward shaping (Babes et al., 2008; Devlin and Kudenko,
2011; Devlin et al., 2011). We will be interested in building upon ideas from the literature on reward
shaping and applying these insights to situations beyond those typically considered. In particular, we
are interested in environments where we only control a single agent, where decisions are not single
actions but rather temporally extended sequences, and where good policies may need to be learned
using function approximation (eg. directly from raw pixels).
Reward shaping methods change the updating rule of all agents in the system using a potential
function which encodes heuristic knowledge about ‘good’ states. If we know the structure of the
game, we can choose an appropriate potential function (Babes et al., 2008; Devlin and Kudenko,
2011; Devlin et al., 2011). A special property of Stag Hunt games is that changing both agents to
optimize the joint reward changes the basin of attraction of the payoff-dominant equilibrium Yoshida
et al. (2008). We can restate this idea as making agents prosocial: that is, changing their utility
function to care not only about their reward but also their partner’s rewards .
Our first contribution is an extension of existing results to the case where we control a single agent.
We show analytically that in 2 × 2 Stag Hunts we can improve the probability of convergence to
a good equilibrium even if we can only make a single agent prosocial. We extend this result to N
1Standard RL techniques assume that the underlying environment is stationary and so MARL can have
convergence issues due to non-stationarity of the learning environment (Lanctot et al., 2017; Lowe et al., 2017;
Foerster et al., 2017b). These algorithmic issues are very important but somewhat orthogonal to the game
theoretic issues we discuss in this paper.
2Note that computing a Nash equilibrium is in general computationally difficult and so we cannot guarantee
convergence for all games in a reasonable time (Daskalakis et al., 2009).
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strategy 2 player games as long as any 2× 2 sub-game is a Stag Hunt. This occurs because in Stag
Hunts equilibria can be ranked by their payoffs and both agents agree on this ranking, thus, causing
one agent to ‘learn towards’ one equilibrium causes others to follow.
We then begin to probe some of the limitations of the analytical result experimentally. In particular,
we ask what happens when Stag Hunts are played by more than 2 agents. We focus on two studied
extension of the Stag Hunt: games on networks (Jackson, 2010; Morris, 2000; Chen et al., 2009) and
multi-player ‘weak link’ games (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer, 2003; Van Huyck et al., 1991).
Our second contribution is to experimentally generalize these insights in a domain where analytical
solutions are difficult: Markov games with Stag Hunt-like structure and learning via function
approximation. We consider a set of two-player grid based games as well as an Atari game and
show that in each of these cases adding prosociality helps policy gradient to converge to good
outcomes. Each group of agents either converges to always playing the the safe or risky equilibrium,
so improving the probability of converging to a good outcome also improves the long run payoff of
the prosocial agent. Thus even in complex Stag Hunt-like games, even if we control just a single
agent, and even if we only care about that agent’s payoff it can still be better to make that agent
prosocial in the long-run.
2 Risk Dominance, the Stag Hunt, and Equilibrium Selection
We begin by illustrating the intuition behind our results with the simple matrix Stag Hunt. In the
Stag Hunt players simultaneously decide to either take a risky option (Hunt the Stag) or a safe option
(Forage). Foraging always yields a safe payoff, whereas Hunting yields a higher payoff if the other
person also hunts but yields a bad payoff if the player shows up to hunt alone (because the Stag
gores her). This is illustrated in the payoff matrix below (rows represent strategy choices for player 1,
columns represent strategy choices for player 2, entries represent payoffs to each player as a function
of strategies chosen):
Player 2
Hunt Forage
Player 1 Hunt (h, h) (g, c)
Forage (c, g) (m,m)
Definition 1 A 2× 2 game is a generalized Stag Hunt if h > c ≥ m > g.
Let A1, A2 be the action spaces of the players and let Ri(a1, a2) be the reward players receive from
a pair of actions. We consider the set of stable points in this game:
Definition 2 Nash equilibria are strategy pairs (a∗1, a∗2) such that for any a′1 we have
R1(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) ≥ R1(a′1, a∗2)
and for any a′2 we have
R2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) ≥ R2(a∗1, a′2).
In a Nash equilibrium, neither agent has incentive to deviate from their chosen strategy given what
the other agent is doing. For this reason, they are possible convergence points of a learning process.
There are two (non-randomized) equilibria here: both choose to Hunt or both choose Forage. Hunting
yields higher payoff for both agents (is the payoff-dominant equilibrium) thus one may hope that
learning agents converge to Hunt. However this may not always be true.
The generalized Stag Hunt conditions imply two things. First, that
(Hunt,Hunt), (Forage, Forage) are the equilibria and (Hunt,Hunt) is payoff dominant.
The second part of the condition b ≥ d implies that the coordination game has a sort of asymmetric
risk, if one player chooses Hunt but the other chooses Forage, only the Hunt player loses. Thus
Forage is a safe action that does well no matter what the other chooses whereas Hunt is a risky
action that only works if the other person also hunts.
We can now consider which equilibrium is more likely to be selected by a general class of learning
dynamics. This example captures much of the intuition behind existing results about why dynamics
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often converge to safe outcomes (Kandori et al., 1993; Nowak, 2006; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998)
as well as the basic idea behind why certain modifications to independent MARL (eg. Devlin and
Kudenko (2011); Devlin et al. (2011); Kapetanakis and Kudenko (2002); Yoshida et al. (2008); Panait
et al. (2008); Matignon et al. (2012)) can help drive the system towards payoff dominant equilibria.
We assume that agents play the game repeatedly (either with each other, themselves in a ‘self-play’
form or with a population of others).3 Agents start with beliefs p1, p2 which are the probabilities they
expect their partner to choose Hunt. Agents best respond to this belief. Having observed the choice
of their partner, they update their beliefs in the correct direction (that is, if the partner chose Hunt,
p goes up). This means that agents choose Hunt if pih + (1 − pi)g ≥ pic + (1 − pi)m. We can
calculate the critical value of p∗ such that if p > p∗ the agent chooses Hunt otherwise they choose
Forage.4
This tells us something about the basins of attraction of each equilibrium. If both agents have beliefs
above p∗ then they will converge to (Hunt,Hunt) - this is because they will play Hunt this period
and only increase their beliefs and thus they will play Hunt next period and so on. A similar
argument holds if both agents start below p∗. If one agent is above and the other is below then the
specifics of the learning rule come into play and limit behavior depends on which of the two attractor
regions they reach first. Note that what matters for the computation of p∗ are not just h and m but
also the off-equilibrium payoffs g and c.5 This is illustrated in figure 1. Interestingly, in games with
more than two strategies the basins of attraction of various equilibria can be informed even by the
presence of strategies which are never played in any equilibrium as well as the exact properties of the
dynamics in question (Panageas and Piliouras, 2016; Nowak, 2006; Kandori et al., 1993).
With this notion of basin of attraction in mind, we ask whether modifying our agents while keeping the
game constant can shift the basin of attraction. We consider a type of agent with social preferences:
Definition 3 A prosocial agent’s total utility from an outcome is given by
Ui(ai, aj) = (1− α)Ri(ai, aj) + αRj(ai, aj).
We refer to α as the agent’s level of prosociality. α = 0 agents are perfectly selfish, α = .5 agents
are fully prosocial (weigh their and their partner’s utility equally) and α = 1 agents are selfless.
We now show our main analytical result as well as a corollary which motivate our experiments. We
relegate the proofs to the Appendix.
Theorem 1 In a generalized Stag Hunt the size of the basin of attraction of (Hunt,Hunt) increases
in both players’ level of prosociality. There exists α¯ ∈ (0, 1] such that if either agent has α ≥ α¯ the
unique interior attractor is (Hunt,Hunt).
Corrolary 1 In any symmetric N ×N game where the only pure equilibria are symmetric and the
payoff matrix subset to any pair of strategies is a generalized Stag Hunt there exists α¯ ∈ (0, 1] such
that if for either player α > α¯ the unique convergence point is the payoff dominant equilibrium.
3This setup does not allow agents to condition their behavior on histories of play (except through the learning
rule). In general, allowing such conditioning greatly increases the strategy space and can create new equilibria
(Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). For example, in social dilemmas (eg. the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma) allowing
conditioning on histories can change the set of attainable payoffs. This change occurs because the socially
optimal outcome of mutual cooperation is not an equilibrium in the one-shot game but can be supported in the
repeated game. However, in Stag Hunts allowing history-conditional strategies does not create ‘better’ equilibria
as the best possible outcome (joint hunting) is already an equilibrium in the one-shot game. For this reason we
will follow the literature and used the standard setup of ‘games that are played repeatedly without being repeated
games’ (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).
4Note that we ignore mixed equilibria in our analysis as they are extremely unstable: for a player to play
a mixed strategy they must be indifferent between all strategies in the support and this set of beliefs is highly
unstable in the Stag Hunt where learning dynamics push both players towards pure strategy equilibria.
5A particularly important related concept is risk dominance (Harsanyi et al., 1988) which asks whether
p∗ > .5 (in which case Hunt is said to be risk-dominant) or not (in which case Forage is risk dominant). Work
in evolutionary game theory shows that in large population evolutionary processes in 2× 2 games with multiple
equilibria it is risk dominance not payoff dominance that serves as the unique convergence point (Kandori et al.,
1993; Nowak, 2006; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). These results typically focus specifically on low mutation
rates and large populations, however their qualitative results carry over to many other learning dynamics. Indeed,
another way to understand risk dominance is to think about it as the basin of attraction of each equilibrium. The
risk dominant equilibrium in a symmetric game is the one with the strictly larger basin of attraction.
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Figure 1: Belief-based learning dynamics in the Stag Hunt game depend on initial states as well as
all entries of the payoff matrix, this same intuition applies to RL-based dynamics which simply use
values of actions.
Theorem 1 and its Corollary implies that in generalized Stag Hunts, any agent can increase their
(expected) payoff after convergence by increasing their α. However, in games with more complex
strategy spaces where some aspects of the game do not obey the Stag Hunt inequality, increasing α
may be counterproductive. We discuss this in more detail in the conclusion. When α is close to 1 the
agent may learn a policy that is both bad for itself and socially inefficient. Considering α ≤ 0.5 at
least guarantees that the agent will only choose to hurt its own payoffs if the resulting outcome is
efficient (increases the sum of the payoffs). Thus we mostly think about prosocial, but not selfless,
agents in practice and look at α ∈ {0, .5} in our experiments.
3 Experiments
3.1 Matrix Stag Hunt
Our theorem implies that if we endow agents (and more importantly, even one agent) with prosocial
preferences then dynamics should now more reliably select the payoff dominant equilibria in 2× 2
matrix games. The relative improvement depends on the learning rule used and details of the payoff
matrix, so we begin by studying policy gradient in the 2× 2 Stag Hunt. We set h (the payoff from
joint hunting) to 2, m and c (the payoff from foraging regardless of what the other person is doing)
to 1 and vary the g (hunting alone and getting gored by the stag) payoff as well as the prosociality
of both players. We train policy gradient based agents with softmax action implementation. For
optimization we use Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014) with a learning rate of .01 as well as random
initialization. We train each pair of agents for 400 rounds and look at average behavior in the last 50
rounds. We train 300 replicates and average them together.
We see from figure 2 (left) that both g and social preferences affect convergence to the payoff
dominant equilibrium. There are situations where we control both agents (eg. in using self play
to find good policies). In this case, we see that adding social preferences to both agents can help
find good optimal equilibria but actually in the dyadic case having a single agent with prosocial
preferences is almost as efficient as having both be prosocial.
3.2 Prosociality With More than 2 Players
The results above show that a single prosocial agent can help in the matrix, dyadic Stag Hunts. An
important question is how robust these results are to changes in the game complexity as well as the
number of players. We move to Stag Hunts with more than 2 agents played on networks.
There is a large literature about coordination games on networks that looks at questions including
which agents should be ‘seeded’ with an initial behavior to get it to spread on a network (Jackson,
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Figure 2: In the Stag Hunt, selfish agents trained reactively with policy gradients fail to do well but the
addition of social preferences to even one of the agents helps guide convergence to a good outcome
though does not guarantee it. Expanding to Stag Hunts beyond dyads shows us that sometimes
prosociality of a single agent can greatly affect outcomes, such as in the case of the central agent on
a star network, but other times even many prosocial agents may not help, such as in the weak-link
game or in the fully connected network Stag Hunt.
2010; Morris, 2000; Chen et al., 2009). A major takeaway from this literature is that seeding more
central agents leads to larger cascades or higher probability of diffusion.
We ask whether a similar relationship holds for the question of making subsets of agents prosocial.
We consider the standard coordination games on graphs setup (Jackson, 2010): agents live on a graph,
in each round each agent chooses an action from Hunt or Forage and plays the Stag Hunt with
all agents that it is connected to using that single action. The agent receives the average (or total)
payoff from these games and updates its strategy for the next iteration. We use the same algorithm,
parameters, and analysis as the dyad Stag Hunt above. We consider 5 agents playing on two graphs:
either a fully connected graph or a star network. We vary the loss to hunting alone as well as how
many (and which) agents we make prosocial.
We also consider the weak-link game which is a type of multiplayer Stag Hunt (Van Huyck et al.,
1990; Camerer, 2003; Van Huyck et al., 1991). Here there are 5 players. Each simultaneously chooses
an effort level ei ∈ {0, . . . , 5}. Players pay a linear cost of effort. This effort goes into a project
and the project’s success is determined by the weakest link, that is the player who put in the least
effort. At the end of the round each agent receives a payoff given by Aminj(ej)− ei. This game has
Stag Hunt properties because the best equilibrium is one where all agents choose to put in maximum
effort but any identical effort levels form equilibria. We apply policy gradient with 5 players and
vary A (which can be thought of as highly related to the risk parameter) as well as agent prosociality.
Note that here we have a choice of how to do prosocial payoffs: we can either combine the agent’s
reward with the average of everyone’s reward (which corresponds to the agent weighing their own
utility against some total ‘global utility’) or use the sum of everyone’s reward (which would cause the
prosocial agent to be fully utilitarian but with a large number of other agents would cause the agent
to ignore their own reward for the common good). For the reported experiments we use the average
and run 100 replicates.
The games and the results are shown in Figure 2. We see that in the case of the star network making
just making the center agent prosocial can greatly increase the probability that the whole group
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Figure 3: Markov games that have complicated policy spaces but preserve high level properties of the
Stag Hunt. In each game agents have access to safe policies (which yield low rewards but work no
matter what the other agent does) or high reward policies that require coordination with the other
agent and can lead to very poor payoffs if the coordination fails.
converges to the payoff dominant outcome. However, in the fully connected network the power that
an individual agent has over where the group converges is quite limited. In the weak-link game even
making all agents prosocial and making the payoff multiplier high still results in poor coordination
on the best equilibrium. This shows that in more complex situations many aspects of the underlying
game can greatly change the ability of a single (or few) prosocial agents to affect outcomes.
3.3 Markov Games with Stag Hunt Properties
We now consider a set of more complex two-player Stag Hunt-like games. Each of these games we
model using the framework of Markov games. In each of these cases we apply a policy gradient
with state representation constructed using a deep convolutional network with inputs as the raw
board pixels. Because we use standard setups from the literature we put the details of the model
architecture/training in the Appendix.
We consider 3 different grid-world games: Markov Stag Hunt, Harvest and Escalation (Figure 3).
In each of these games two agents move on a 5 × 5 grid and can move in any of the 4 cardinal
directions. In the Markov Stag Hunt the grid is populated with a Stag and 2 plants. Moving over a
plant gives either agent 1 point and causes the plant to disappear and re-appear in another part of the
board. Moving over the Stag causes an agent to lose g points but if both agents move over the stag
simultaneously they each gain 5 points and the stag disappears and re-appears randomly elsewhere
on the board. In each time period the stag moves towards the closest agent to it, although the stag can
never catch an agent who continues to move away from it.
Like in the standard Stag Hunt, there are two equilibria here - either both agents try to get the stag or
they both try to stay away from it and pick up plants. There is asymmetric risk, if one chooses to try
to hunt while the other avoids, the hunter will suffer the consequences.
In the Harvest game at each time step a plant can appear randomly somewhere on the board (up to 4
plants can be on the board at a time). Each plant is born ‘young’, then every time step turns ‘mature’
with probability rmature. While a plant is mature it can die on each time step with probability rdeath.
The probabilities are always selected such that each plant lives for 20 time steps in expectation.
Players can move over plants to pick them up. Players receive 1 point if they up a young plant,
however waiting until each plant becomes mature and picking it up yields 2 points to both players.
Thus the coordination question is whether to wait or rush for the plants. Choosing to wait is an
equilibrium that yields high payoffs for both players. However, just like stag hunting it incurs a risk
that one’s partner loses their nerve and grabs the young plant.
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Figure 4: We see that the general pattern from the 2× 2 Stag Hunt generalizes to the Markov games.
Increases in risk lead to convergence to equilibria with less coordination while giving prosocial
preferences to agents increases the dyad’s ability to coordinate on good outcomes. The weakest
effect exists in our Markov Stag Hunt as well as Harvest with extremely high risk. Lines reflect
average payoffs over replicates smoothed over 1000 episode blocks. Error bars reflect standard errors
estimated using independent replicates.
In the Coordinated Escalation game a special marker appears on one of the squares. If the agents step
on the square together, they both receive one point, at which point an adjacent square lights up. If
the agents step together onto the next square, they receive 1 point. If at any time an agent breaks the
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streak (eg. by stepping off the path), the other agent receives a penalty of some multiplier times the
current length T of the streak and the game ends. The current streak length T is observed (encoded
in the state). This game has many equilibria, where both agents play to keep streaks of size T but no
more with risk escalating at each time step (as the reward from further escalation is always 1 but the
cost from one’s partner failing to continue the pattern increases linearly).
We also consider a version of Escalation where agents must learn from raw pixels. We use methods
employed in Tampuu et al. (2017) to adapt Atari Pong to construct Escalation Pong. In Escalation
Pong each agent controls a player, each time the ball is hit both agents receives a reward of 1, however
if an agent drops the ball (allows it to pass) then the other agent receives a reward of −k where
k is proportional to the number of times the ball has been hit back and forth. The game can end
stochastically at any time period and also ends when any player drops the ball.
We again compare the performance (here in terms of payoff to our agent) from situations where both
agents are selfish, both agents are prosocial, and where only our agent is prosocial. In all conditions,
both agents start with randomly initialized policies and learn by playing with each other. Figure 4
shows that the intuition from the coordination game replicates in these more complex environments:
giving agents social preferences can help lead to coordination on payoff-dominant strategies. Both
the risk and whether one or both agents have social preferences plays an important role.
While the broad trends are replicated across all four games, Figure 4 also emphasizes that the exact
effect of prosociality is dependent on the details of the particular game. For example, in both
Escalation games, but not in Markov Stag Hunt or Harvest, payoffs vary quite smoothly with the risk
and prosociality. The reason is that in the Escalation games, there is a large set of joint policies which
can be ordered (ie. coordinate for longer) and have increasing payoff and risk while in Harvest and
Markov Stag Hunt the joint policies of interest are either those which always or never hunt/wait.
We also observe that single-agent prosociality can provide benefit in Harvest but little in Markov Stag
Hunt. The reason is the relative basin of attraction of the two strategies for a single player. In the
Harvest game, initial random policies have a good chance of stumbling upon corn in the ‘Old’ phase,
especially if the corn spends a high fraction of time in that phase. If one agent waits, its easy for the
other agent to learn to wait.
However, in the Markov Stag Hunt, the stag chases the agent closest to it and for random exploration
to find good strategies the agent who is not being chased has to wander upon the stag. Thus it is
more likely that, during initial training, the agent which is being chased steps on the stag by random
exploration and will not be coordinated with its partner. In this case even a prosocial agent will learn
to avoid the stag. If both agents are prosocial however, they are both encouraged to play H to avoid
their partner being gored.
These games illustrate that the basin of attraction for equilibria in a game with more than two
strategies are influenced not only by the payoffs of the two equilibria, but also the payoffs of all
the non-equilibrium policies. In the Harvest game the fraction of time in the young stage does not
affect the payoff to either equilibrium but it does change the payoffs of ‘random’ policies that pick
up a mixture of young and old corn proportional to their lifetime. Similarly we observed that in a
version of the Stag Hunt where the stag runs away from the agents then even for reasonably large
gore penalties the agents never learn H because during exploration they are unlikely to both step
on the stag at the same time. This further underscores a point made by Leibo et al. (2017) that the
‘difficulty’ of discovering various strategies can affect equilibrium selection and furthermore that this
may be dependent not only on the underlying game itself but on the function approximation used in
our RL algorithm.
4 Conclusion
Game theoretic properties of multi-agent systems can hamper the ability of RL methods to converge
to payoff-dominant policies even when such policies are equilibria. We have shown that prosocial
preferences applied to even a single agent can increase the size of the basin of attraction in matrix
games and that this extends to complex Markov games with function approximation.
Prosociality can have benefits but it can also carry costs. First, if the game (or some part of the
game) is not a Stag Hunt, then prosociality for a single agent may introduce new equilibria that are
suboptimal for that agent. For example, in a social dilemma a prosocial agent may be exploited by
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its partner.6 Second, in typical environments where an agent’s actions only weakly influence on the
payoffs of others, prosocial rewards increase the variance of observed rewards and thus may make
reinforcement learning algorithms converge more slowly. Finally, while we assume that the agent’s
partner is sufficiently adaptive to learn H , it is better for the agent to play selfishly if the partner is
not sufficiently adaptive.
We have focused on prosociality because it is a simple way to modify our agent by changing the reward
function. In the related field of social dilemmas other work focuses on modifying agent’s models of
the environment to include the fact that other agents are also learning and so our actions today can
lead to different policies for our partner tomorrow (Babes et al., 2008; Lerer and Peysakhovich, 2017;
Foerster et al., 2017a). A recent contribution to such ‘learning shaping’ uses an explicit model of
a partner’s learning process included in the objective function of the agent (Foerster et al., 2017a).
Such an approach has been shown to work in simple social dilemmas and so exploring it further, in
particular in combination with simpler heuristic methods, is an attractive future direction.
Off-equilibrium payoffs are an important criterion for determining the basin of attraction of multi-
agent optimization. However, an equally important criterion which we have not analyzed is function
approximation. Deep RL does not work on the state space of a problem directly but rather approxi-
mates that state space using neural network techniques (Silver et al., 2016; Mnih et al., 2015). The
architectures of these networks can affect the relative complexity and thus relative likelihood of
different policies. This, in turn, can affect the basins of attraction for various equilibria (Leibo et al.,
2017; Tamar et al., 2016). Good choices of priors (ie. model architectures) have allowed AI to make
great strides in fields like computer vision and prosocial important direction in multi-agent systems is
further exploring good architectures for learning in these conditions.
We close with a practical question: how can we construct agents that can coordinate productively
with humans? It has been shown that humans often fail to coordinate on payoff-dominant equilibria
(Van Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer, 2003) but that artificial agents can be added to help groups
coordinate better Shirado and Christakis (2017). We have shown that learning algorithms must take
into account the learning behavior of other agents if they are to learn to coordinate in multi-agent
environments. Understanding how to design human-machine hybrid systems in ways that properly
account for human psychology (Crandall et al., 2017; Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2016; Rand et al., 2014;
Hauser et al., 2014; Ouss and Peysakhovich, 2015; Arechar et al., 2016; Mao et al., 2017) and also
human learning strategies (Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Peysakhovich, 2016) is an important
practical question to extending this work.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: To be able to use basin of attraction arguments, we must have that the structure
of Nash equilibria of the game does not change as we change the utility functions. A key aspect
of the Stag Hunt is that changing the prosociality parameters of the players does not delete the
payoff-dominant equilibrium (since H gives the highest payoff to both players), though if c > m
it may delete the payoff-dominated one. In addition, given any α, (F,H) and (H,F ) are never
equilibria (since the player choosing F always wants to deviate). Thus, it is sufficient to look at the
basins of attraction of the two original equilibria.
Let p be the probability that the other agent plays Hunt. For an agent with prosociality α to (weakly)
prefer Hunt over Forage the following must hold:
ph+ (1− p)((1− α)g + αc) ≥ p(αg + (1− α)c) + (1− p)m
Solving for p∗, the minimum p that leads the agent to play Hunt yields
p∗ =
(m− g)− α(c− g)
(h+m− g − c) .
By the Stag Hunt inequalities, all three bracketed quantities must be strictly positive; therefore, p∗
decreases in α (i.e. the basin of attraction increases as α increases). Solving for p∗ = 0 determines
the values α∗ which makes Hunt a weakly dominant strategy:
α∗ =
m− g
c− g .
By the Stag Hunt inequalities, m− g ≤ c− g, and both are positive, therefore, α∗ ∈ (0, 1].
Proof of Corollary 1: Note that because the game restricted to any two strategies is a Stag Hunt, we
can use the same argument as in Theorem 1 to look only at the original set of equilibria: the best
possible equilibrium is not removed when we add prosociality (since it optimizes the joint reward),
worse equilibria can be removed, and no other strategy pair (i, j) can become an equilibrium.
Consider an N ×N payoff matrix U for agent 1; we assume symmetry, i.e. U (2) = UT for simplicity.
We can order the strategies such that for all i < j, Uii ≥ Ujj without loss of generality. Then every
subspace of U is a stag hunt if for all i < j,
Uii > Uji ≥ Ujj > Uij .
If agent 1 has prosociality α, then its payoff matrix is Uα = (1− α)U + αUT .
Uα is a linear interpolation between U and UT , so there exists α < 1 for which
Uαii > Uij ≥ Uαjj > Uαji
for all i < j. Thus for agent 1, i weakly dominates j for all i < j. If agent 1 plays 0, then 0 is a
dominant strategy for agent 2 (for any α).
5.1 Details of Markov Game Training
For grid world Markov games, we train policies pi modeled by a multi-layer convolutional neural
network. For a given board size, the model has dlog2(k)e+ 1 repeated layers, each consisting of a
2D convolution with kernel size 3, followed by batch normalization and ReLU. The first layer has
stride 1, while the successive layers each have stride 2, which decreases the width and height from k
to dk/2e while doubling the number of channels.
We perform reinforcement learning via policy gradient using Reinforce Williams (1992) and RMSProp
for optimization. The model is updated episodically in batches of 64 episodes, with a discount rate of
0.99. Markov stag hunt and Harvest are trained for 200,000 episodes with episode length drawn from
exp(250), while Escalation is trained for 500,000 episodes of length at most 50 (since Escalation only
extends for the duration of coordination). For Markov Stag Hunt, we use an entropy regularization
weight of 0.05 Mnih et al. (2016).
For Escalation Pong, we use the ALE environment modified for 2-player play as proposed in Tampuu
et al. (2017). We modify the game so that each paddle hit gives a reward of +1 to each player, and
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when a ’point’ is scored, the game ends and the player who scored the point receives a reward of
−a× k, where k is the total number of hits and a is a hyperparameter. We make the escalation level
k observable in the state by brightening a 20 × 20 patch in the center of the board by an amount
proportional to k.
We train policies directly from pixels, using the pytorch-a3c package (https://github.com/
ikostrikov/pytorch-a3c).
Policies are trained directly from pixels via A3C (Mnih et al., 2016). Inputs are rescaled to 42× 42
and normalized, and we augment the state with the difference between successive frames. We use 38
threads for A3C, and train for a total of 380,000 games (10,000 per thread), which takes 3 – 4 hours
on a 40-core machine. We use the default settings from pytorch-a3c: a discount rate of 0.99, 20-step
returns, and entropy regularization weight of 0.01. We found a slightly lower learning rate of 3e− 5
was required for stable convergence.
The policy is implemented as a convolutional neural network with four layers, following pytorch-a3c.
Each layer uses a 3 × 3 kernel with stride 2, followed by ELU. The network has two heads for
the actor and critic. We elide the LSTM layer used in the pytorch-a3c library, as we found it to be
unnecessary.
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